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THE LONG HARD FALL FROM MOUNT
OLYMPUS: THE 2002 SALT LAKE CITY
OLYMPIC GAMES BRIBERY SCANDAL
THOMAS A. HAMILTON
I. INTRODUCTION

When recollecting the XIX Winter Olympic Games at Salt Lake City,
what first comes to mind? Is it Sarah Hughes' gold medal winning figure
skating routine, the Canadian men's ice hockey team's gold medal game
victory over the United States, or Apolo Anton Ohno's quest for five gold
medals?' Although these are all notable accomplishments, they are unlikely
to be the first thought out of any Olympic enthusiast's mind. Rather, it is
likely that the first thought turns to one of the many scandals that scarred the
games. From bribery to drugs, the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games had
it all.
The first scandal hit before the games even started. 2 The President and
Vice President of the Salt Lake Bid Committee were caught offering bribes to
members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 3 Thomas Welch
and David Johnson, the President and Vice President, respectively, have
subsequently been indicted on fraud and bribery charges. 4 Just when we
thought all of the scandals were over, and we prepared for the games
themselves, scandal once again hit the Salt Lake City Olympic Games.
During the pairs' figure skating competition, dual gold medals were eventually
awarded as the result of French figuring skating judge Marie-Reine Le
Gougne's favorable score for the Russian pair of Elena Berezhnaya and Anton
Thomas A. Hamilton is the Contracts Counsel for Thomson Reuters. Mr. Hamilton received
his B.S. in Biological Aspects of Conservation & History from the University of Wisconsin in 2000.
In 2004 Mr. Hamilton received his J.D. from Marquette University and a Sports Law Certificate from
the National Sports Law Institute.
1. Int'l Olympic Comm., Olympic Medal Winners, OLYMPIC.ORG, http://www.olympic.org/en/
content/All-Olympic-results-sincel896/?Games=-1334142&AthleteName=&Category-&Sport-&
Event-&MenGender-false&WomenGender-false&MixedGender-false&TeamClassification=false&
IndividualClassification=false&Continent-&Country=&GoldMedal=false&SilverMedal=false&Bron
zeMedal=false&TargetResults-true (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
2. See generally United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Sikharulidze to the disadvantage of the Canadian pair of Jamie Sale and David
Pelletier, when it was discovered that there was a vote swapping agreement
between the French and Russian skating federations. 5 In November 2003,
over a year and a half after the conclusion of the Games, the controversy
surrounding the games lingered. 6 This time, the scandal concerned allegations
of doping. 7 Although doping has been around almost as long as the games
themselves, the IOC has made great efforts to ban doping in recent years,
particularly through the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency and Court
of Arbitration for Sport. These agencies were created to control use of
particular banned substances and to enforce the World Anti-Doping Code
through arbitration. The discovery of THG was very troubling to the IOC
because this newly discovered steroid was able to avoid discovery during any
of the scientific tests performed at the Games, which were meant to quickly
and accurately discover banned substances in Olympic competitors.8 Upon
this discovery, the IOC immediately decided to retest over two hundred
samples from the Salt Lake Games to determine whether any individuals used
THG to enhance their performances. 9
These three scandals highlight the bitter aftertaste the games left after the
conclusion of formal competition, and unfortunately, in many ways, they have
overshadowed the competitions and athletic accomplishments themselves.
The focus of the remainder of this article surrounds the first scandal, which
included the bribery of multiple IOC officials in securing the acceptance of
Salt Lake City's bid for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games.' 0 Although there
have also been discussions of reform within the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) since the events in Salt Lake City, that discussion has
been omitted in this article to focus on the reforms within the IOC.
Part II of this article discusses the facts surrounding the scandal. This is
followed by Part III, which takes a concentrated look at the IOC's response to
the events in Salt Lake City, including the development of the IOC Ethics
Commission. Part IV focuses on the United States government's response to
the events in Salt Lake City. This includes the criminal prosecution of the
individuals within the Salt Lake Bid Committee who were found to have

5. Jon Wertheim, The Year in Sports: Top Stories of 2002: #4 Skategate, CNNSI.COM, Dec. 10,

2002, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/2002/year/stories/4/.
6. IOC Approve Retesting of Salt Lake Samples, SI.CoM, Dec. 4, 2003, http://sportsillustrated.

cnn.com/2003/more/12/04/bc.eu.spt.oly.iocmeetin.ap/index.html.
7. Id
8. Id.
9. Id
10. See generally United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003).
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bribed the various IOC officials and a congressional investigation into the
IOC's site selection process. Part V examines the critiques made by various
scholars, the United States government, and IOC members following the
IOC's reforms, which resulted from the events in Salt Lake City. This article
then concludes with Parts VI and VII, which provide recommendations for
further improvements that can still be made and the road ahead as the Olympic
Movement progresses through the twenty-first century.
II. THE SCANDAL

The scandal that surrounds the IOC's choice of Salt Lake City to host the
XIX Winter Olympic Games is what some consider the biggest ethics scandal
in the history of the Olympic Movement.II The bid process is initiated when
the organizing committee, here the Salt Lake Bid Committee, and the national
governing body, here the USOC, file an Undertaking with the IOC.12 In this
Undertaking, the two parties jointly agree to abide by the provisions in the
IOC's Charter and to act within the IOC's instructions to candidate cities
bidding on the Games. 13 In 1994, the USOC and Salt Lake Bid Committee
filed an Undertaking with the IOC to request consideration as a candidate
city. 14 Subsequently, the IOC distributed a series of instructions to all of the
2002 Winter Olympic Games candidate cities and IOC members involved in
the bidding process.1 5 IOC members, who are also bound by the IOC Charter,
must also take an oath to remain free from commercial influence.1 6 The
instructions to candidate cities "limited certain expenditures by candidate
cities, created rules concerning visits by IOC members to candidate cities, and
placed limitations on the value of gifts and other benefits which could be given
to IOC members by and on behalf of candidate cities."17
From February 1998 to July 1999, Thomas Welch, President of the Salt
Lake Bid Committee, and David Johnson, Vice President of the Salt Lake Bid
Committee, diverted the income of the bid committee by "'giving. .. money
and other material benefits to influence IOC members to vote for Salt Lake
City to host the Olympic Winter Games[.]"' 8 Furthermore, it is alleged that
11. ANDREW JENNINGS & CLARE SAMBROOK, THE GREAT OLYMPIC SWINDLE: WHEN THE
WORLD WANTED ITS GAMES BACK 49 (2000).
12. See Welch, 327 F.3d at 1085.
13. Id. at 1085.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id (quoting the indictment).
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these two Salt Lake Bid Committee board members directed a Salt Lake Bid
Committee sponsor to make a series of payments to the board members in
cash, so that the payments would not appear on the Committee's books and
could be used for their "own personal purposes." 19
According to the complaint, Thomas Welch and David Johnson
(1) made direct and indirect payments of money and other
things of substantial value to IOC members; (2) paid for
tuition, living expenses, and spending money for the children
and relatives of IOC members; (3) paid for medical expenses
of IOC members and their relatives; and (4) paid for personal
and vacation travel expenses of IOC members and their
relatives.
Defendants also purportedly obtained lawful
permanent resident alien status for an IOC member's son
through submission of false and misleading documents to
immigration authorities.
Defendants allegedly conferred
valuable benefits upon amenable IOC members totaling
approximately $ 1,000,000 in value. 20
More specifically, the alleged gifts to IOC members included:
$320,000 to Jean Claude Ganga of the Congo; (2) $ 91,000 to
Bashir Attarabulsi of Libya; (3) $42,000 to Charles Mukora of
Kenya; (4) $20,000 to Zen Gadir of the Sudan; (5) $78,000 to
Un Yong Kim of South Korea; (6) $195,000 to Rene Essomba
of Cameroon; (7) $3,000 to Austin Sealy of Barbados; (8)
$30,000 to Augustin Arroyo of Ecuador; (9) $1,200 to
Slobodan Filopovic of Yugoslavia; (10) $99,000 to David
Sibandze of Swaziland; (11) $107,000 to Lamine Keita of
Mali; (12) $33,750 to Pirjo Haggman of Finland; (13) $8,000
to Guirandou N'Daiye of the Ivory Coast; (14) $5,000 to
Anton Geesink of the Netherlands; and (15) $20,000 to Sergio
Santander-Fantini of Chile. 21
Thomas Welch and Robert Johnson are suspected to have concealed these
gifts in a variety of ways. They allegedly
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id at 1085-086 n.4.
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(1) made payments to IOC members in cash; (2) created and
funded a sham program known as the National Olympic
Committee Program ostensibly to provide athletes in
underprivileged countries with training and equipment; (3)
entered into sham contracts and consulting agreements on
behalf of the [Salt Lake Bid Committee]; (4) recorded
payments and benefits which the [Salt Lake Bid Committee]
provided to IOC members inaccurately in corporate books and
records; (5) placed false, fraudulent, and misleading
information in [Salt Lake Bid Committee] financial records
and statements, and (6) failed to disclose material information
in public documents. 2 2
III. THE IOC REACTS
Following the discovery of these various "gifts" provided to various IOC
members by the Salt Lake Bid Committee, the IOC launched its own internal
investigations into the dealings in Salt Lake City. 23 Juan Antonio Samaranch,
IOC President at the time of the scandal, initiated this investigation by
appointing Dick Pound, the then-IOC Vice President, to lead a committee to
investigate any wrongdoing in the bidding process for the 2002 Winter
Olympic Games.24 IOC President Samaranch also appointed Thomas Bach, a
former Olympic fencer from Germany, Pal Schmitt, a former Hungarian
fencer, Jacques Rogge, and Judge Mbaye to join Dick Pound on the
investigative committee. 25 It is important to note that every member
appointed to this investigative committee was also a member of the IOC
board.26

The goal of the investigative committee was to wipe out corruption within
the IOC once and for all. 27 The first action this committee took was to issue
an apology "to the Olympic athletes who have inspired us through the years
and whose lives so poignantly embody the Olympic ideals."2 8 Dick Pound,
head of the investigative committee, also attempted to deflect criticism of the
IOC by stating that "the Sydney games will be one of the greatest ever ...
When this is all over, the IOC will emerge a much stronger and more effective
22. Id. at 1086.
23. JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 67.
24. Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 70.
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organization." 29
In 1999, upon conclusion of the work by the investigative committee,
Dick Pound stated, "The investigation has been an unflinching exercise in
pursuing the truth and will be unflinching in its recommendations." 30 In fact,
three individuals resigned even before Pound's determination was issued. 3 1
These included Pirjo Haggman of Finland, Bashir Mohamed Attarabulsi of
Libya, and David Sibandze of Swaziland. 32 A few days later, in Lausanne,
Switzerland, Dick Pound announced sanctions against fourteen members,
including the suspension and eventual expulsion of six IOC board members.33
The six expelled board members were Augustin Arroyo of Ecuador, Jean
Claude Ganga of the Congo, Zen Gadir of the Sudan, Lamine Keita of Mali,
Charles Mukora of Kenya, and Sergio Santander of Chile. 34 Holland's Anton
Geesink and ten others received warning letters, and with the death of the final
member involved in the scandal, Dick Pound closed his investigation into
wrongdoings by the IOC membership.3 5 But, Juan Antonio Samaranch was
not completely satisfied. In February 1999, Samaranch sent letters to all of the
cities that had applied for bids for the Olympics since 1996.36 Among the
thirty-seven bidding cities encompassed in this group, none of them raised
major allegations on IOC members not already under investigation. 37
Although there were no additional findings of major violations, 38 the
controversy did not end there. A letter from IOC member Mario Pescante
revealed that some IOC members requested scholarships from the Rome
Olympic Bid Committee, which was attempting to secure a bid to host the
2004 Summer Olympic Games. 39 He also questioned why the IOC never
performed a detailed investigation of the selected city, Athens, Greece. 40 An
official from Anchorage, Alaska also confirmed that IOC members, during
Anchorage's quest to host the 1992 and 1994 Winter Olympic Games,

29. Id. at 70.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id.
33. Id at 71.
34. Id
35. IOC Crisis and Reform Chronology, OLYMPIC.ORG, 1999, http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/
enreport 590.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2010), at 2 [hereinafter IOC Crisisand Reform].
36. JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 72.
37. IOC Crisis and Reform, supra note 35, at 1.
38. Id.
39. JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 72.
40. Id
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solicited bribes. 4 1 It is important to note that, although allegations of bribe
solicitations arose during the bid solicitation process for games other than Salt
Lake City, there is no evidence that any of these other bribery requests were
ever fulfilled. 42 After finding no evidence that any of these requests were ever
fulfilled, the IOC concluded their investigation into specific acts of
wrongdoing during the bid processes for hosting the Olympic Games. 43
Following the previously discussed investigation, the IOC developed an
Ethics Commission, which began drafting a Code of Ethics on May 3, 1999.44
A mere three weeks later, on May 25, 1999, the IOC Ethics Commission
finalized the Code of Ethics, which was later introduced at the 109th IOC
Session in Seoul, Korea on June 16, 1999.45 The Preamble to the IOC Code
of Ethics states that the "International Olympic Committee and each of its
members, the cities wishing to organise [sic] the Olympic Games ... and the
National Olympic Committees ... restate their commitment to the Olympic
Charter and in particular its Fundamental Principles." 46 Although the
Preamble seems to encompass all of those with a connection to the Olympic
movement, the language that follows concentrates on the responsibilities of the
candidate cities. 4 7 For instance, Article 14, which focuses on the sanctions for
violating the Code of Ethics, only speaks to the possible withdrawal of a city's
candidacy and possible sanctions against a National Olympic Committee by
not allowing them to submit any future candidate cities. 48 One of the few
focuses on the IOC itself concerns language placing the selection of the host
city under the control of the IOC Ethics Committee. 4 9 On April 26, 2007, the
IOC Code of Ethics underwent a subsequent revision at the IOC Executive
Committee meeting in Beijing, China. 50 With this revision, the IOC added a
prohibition against betting on the Olympic Games,5 1 but more significantly, it
removed the provision requiring the Ethics Commission to submit a report to

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See IOC Crisis and Reform, supra note 35, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Preamble, IOC CODE OF ETHICS, (2007), availableat http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en
report_17.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
47. Id.
48. IOC RULES OF CONDUCT APPLICABLE TO ALL CITIES WISHING TO ORGANISE THE OLYMPIC
GAMES, Art. 14 (2007), available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report 696.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter IOC RULES OF CONDUCT].
49. Id. at Art. 12.
50. IOC CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 46.
51. Id. at § A(5).
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the IOC on the application of the Code and any breaches it has discovered. 52
The removal of this provision from the IOC Code of Ethics creates an
antithesis from how the IOC reacted to the events of the 2002 Olympics and
the call for increased transparency that one normally finds within an
organization after a scandal and crisis. 53 For example, after the fiscal crisis in
2008 and 2009, central banks across the world called for increased
transparency within their own organizations in an effort to prevent a similar
crisis from occurring in the future. 54
The IOC Ethics Commission, in Article 9 of its Implementing Provision of
the Code of Ethics relating to the "Rules of Conduct Applicable to All Cities
Wishing to Organize the Olympic Games," clearly bans candidate cities from
giving gifts to IOC members. 55 Prior to the enactment of these rules, giving
gifts to IOC members by candidate cities was not clearly forbidden. These
Rules of Conduct also regulate activity between candidate cities, outlawing
collusion to influence decisions by the IOC members. 56 Upon a proof of a
breach of any rule in the Rules of Conduct, the Ethics Commission may issue
a warning to the city. 57 If the Ethics Commission finds a severe or repeated
violation, it may propose to the IOC Executive Committee for the withdrawal
of the city's candidature. 58
Following these reforms, the IOC has
implemented these rules into the documents presented to potential candidate
cities.59 Before any city can enter the initial stages of the bidding process for
the Games, it must first sign that it has completely read and agrees to abide by
the "Rules of Conduct Applicable to All Cities Wishing to Organise [sic] the
Olympic Games." 60 Finally, it is important to note that all ethics violation
referrals to the Ethics Commission are kept confidential within the IOC unless
the IOC wishes to make it public, allowing the IOC to hide any allegations if it
so chooses. 6 1

52. Id at § G(4).
53. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, At the Institute for Monetary and Economic
Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, Japan: Central Bank Independence,
Transparency, and Accountability (May 25, 2010).
54. Id.
55. IOC RULES OF CONDUCT, supra note 48, at Art. 9.
56. Id at Art. 13.
57. Id. at Art. 14.
58. See id.
59. IOC CANDIDATE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE FOR GAMES OF THE XXX OLYMPIAD 2012
(2003), available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/enreport_711 .pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter IOC CANDIDATE ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURE].
60. Id.
61. IOC RULES OF CONDUCT, supra note 48, at Art. 14.
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Although the IOC Code of Ethics does not focus on or reform the duties of
IOC members, other documents produced concurrently by the IOC Ethics
Commission focus on the behavior of IOC members. The first document
establishes rules concerning conflicts of interest affecting the behavior of
Olympic parties. 6 2 This document applies to all Olympic parties, which the
IOC Code of Ethics defines as "[t]he International Olympic Committee and
each of its members, the cities wishing to organize the Olympic Games, the
Organising Committees of the Olympic Games and the National Olympic
Committees." 63 A conflict of interest is defined as including "personal and/or
material involvement ... with suppliers of the Olympic party concerned;
personal and/or material involvement with sponsors, broadcasters, various
contracting parties; [and] personal and/or material involvement with an
organization [sic] liable to benefit from the assistance of the Olympic party
concerned." 64 Furthermore, Article 6 notes, "[a]ny case of conflict of interest
is dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Olympic Charter and the
Rules of Procedures of the Ethics Commission." 65 The IOC Ethics
Commission Rules of Procedure allow for the Commission, in investigating
cases, including those concerning conflicts of interest, to appoint a rapporteur
to study the case at issue and call upon the assistance of experts it appoints. 66
Rule 23 of the Olympic Charter, in section 1.1, lists the punishment for IOC
members; providing that violations of the Ethics Code can either result in a
reprimand or a suspension, which is determined by the IOC Executive
Board. 67 Following the December 1999 revision of the Olympic Charter, a
member can only be expelled upon a recommendation of the IOC Executive
Board to the IOC General Session, which subsequently votes for the expulsion
with a two-thirds majority in favor of removing the offending member
required for expulsion. 68
62. IOC RULES CONCERNING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AFFECTING THE BEHAVIOUR OF
OLYMPIC PARTIES (2006), available at, http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en report 695.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter IOC RULES CONCERNING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST].
63. IOC CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 46.

64. RULES CONCERNING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. IOC CODE OF ETHICS AND OTHER TEXTS, RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE
INVESTIGATION OF CASES BROUGHT BEFORE THE IOC ETHICS COMMISSION (2009), at 138,
available at http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/Code-Ethique-2009-WebEN.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF
CASES].
67. OLYMPIC CHARTER, CHAPTER II, RULE 23, at 50, available at http://www.olympic.org/
Documents/Olympic%20Charter/Charter en201 0.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
68. IOC AMENDMENTS TO THE OLYMPIC CHARTER AS ENACTED AT THE IOC 110' SESSION
(1999), Rule 20 § 3.8, available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en-report_589.pdf (last visited
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Although this ends the IOC reform immediately following the Salt Lake
Bidding Scandal, it does not complete the story. Another interested party was
soon to get involved, the United States government.
IV. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REACTS
On October 14, 1999, the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on
Commerce (Subcommittee) held a hearing on the need for reform in the IOC's
site selection process. 69 Representative Upton, in opening the investigation,
stated
[A] culture of corruption that exists within the bidding for the
Olympic Games . . . encourages the practice of excessive

lobbying of IOC members. This activity, this culture must
stop. It is tarnishing the pride and prestige of the Olympic
Games, and it is not fair to the athletes or the cities all over the
world who are bidding for the honor of hosting the games. 70
The hearing consisted of hundreds of pages of rhetoric insisting that the
IOC and the USOC reform their methods to prevent this type of corruption
from ever tarnishing the games again. 7 1 This hearing also outlined the
responsibilities of interested parties within the United States during the
bidding process under the law. 72 They are outlined as follows:
The IOC Charter and the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur
Sports Act set out the USOC's responsibility for the selection
of a United States city to hold the Olympic Games: 1.
Interested cities go through a bidding process before the
USOC to prove their capacity and abilities to seek the award
of the Olympic Games from the IOC. 2. The USOC then
selects one city to be its candidate to the IOC for the Olympic
Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter IOC AMENDMENTS].
69. See generally The Olympics Site Selection Process: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong., 1, GPO.GOV, 1999,

http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/house05chl06.html

[hereinafter Olympics Site Selection

Process].

70. Id (statement of Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman Subcomm. on oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Commerce).
7 1. See generally id.
72. See id at 35.
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Games. 3. If successful, that city forms a bidding committee
comprised of individuals from the city which actively bids for
the Games. 4. If the IOC awards the Games to that city, it
must form an organizing committee comprised of individuals
from the city, representatives of the USOC and the country's
IOC members as required by the Olympic and Amateur Sports
Act and the IOC. 73
Although this hearing contained lots of rhetoric and advice to the IOC on
how it should toughen its internal regulations, it is only a recommendation
because United States law can merely regulate the actions of the USOC and
candidate cities through provisions in the Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act of
1978.74 The United States Congress could have gone as far as passing a law
prohibiting the USOC from participating in any IOC sanctioned event, but
there is no doubt that any such legislation would fail, as it would result in the
absence of the United States in future Olympic Games.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Subcommittee decided to wait for the
end of the IOC's internal investigation. 75 The conclusions of the IOC's
internal investigation were outlined earlier and, therefore, warrant no further
discussion at this time.
Although the United States Congress decided to wait for the IOC's
internal investigation to take its course, the United States Justice Department
promptly acted in charging those involved in the bribery scandal.76 The
United States charged Thomas Welch, President of the Salt Lake Bid
Committee, and David Johnson, Vice President of the Salt Lake Bid
Committee, with numerous bribery offenses, unlawful use of communications
in interstate and foreign commerce, mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to
perform each of these unlawful acts. 77 On November 15, 2001, the United
States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed all fifteen counts
against Robert Welch and David Johnson. 7 8 The United States quickly
appealed the dismissal and won on appeal, and the case has been remanded
back to the district court. 79 Presently, the case is stalled at the district court
level where the case is awaiting the extradition of John Kim, the son of Un
73. Id. (prepared statement of Robert H. Helmick).
74. See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C.S. §220503(8) (2002).
75. Olympics Site Selection Process, supra note 69, at 135.

76.
77.
78.
79.

See generally United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1084-085.
See generally United States v. Welch, 248 F.Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Utah, Nov.15, 2001).
Welch, 327 F.3d at 1109.
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Yong Kim, who received extra benefits from the two defendants.80
Pending the outcome of United States v. Welch, the United States
government has finished its criminal investigation into the Salt Lake Olympic
Games bid bribery scandal without placing significant pressure on the IOC and
without altering the statutory framework of the United States to prevent
similar activities in the future. Presently, it appears that the United States
Congress, by not altering United States law following the Salt Lake bid
controversy, feels that the current status of United States bribery laws is
sufficient in deterring. future illegal acts. Of course, this is being severely
tested in the Welch case. If Thomas Welch and David Johnson are eventually
found innocent of all charges, or if the case continues to remain stalled due to
the difficulty of extraditing John Kim, the sufficiency of United States law in
the bribery of non-government foreign individuals may come under significant
criticism.
V. CRITIQUING THE

IOC RESPONSE

Although many see the IOC response to the Salt Lake City Olympic
Games bid scandal as a step in the right direction, many still feel that it is
insufficient in preventing future improprieties. As has been previously stated,
the events surrounding the Salt Lake candidature are not exclusive to the
bidding process for the 2002 Olympic Games. Allegations have arisen that the
bidding process for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, awarded to Atlanta,
also involved the bribing of IOC officials. 8 1 Representative Upton, Chairman
of the Subcommittee, in his opening statement in the congressional
investigation on the Salt Lake scandal, stated
We are hoping that Salt Lake City's actions were an
aberration, but sadly, as the Atlanta report so graphically
confirmed, Salt Lake City was not an aberration. True,
Atlanta's experience does not rise to the same level as Salt
Lake City, but it is also true that there is a system or, as I
have identified, a culture of corruption that exists within
the bidding for the Olympic Games that encourages the
practice of excessive lobbying of IOC members. 82
80. Alan Abrahamson, These Games Are for Keeps: Trial of Salt Lake Olympic Bid Leaders
Welch andJohnson on 15 Felony Charges Starts Today, and They Could Face 75 Years In PrisonIf

Convicted,LATIMES.COM, Oct. 31, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/3 1/sports/sp-oly3 1.
8 1. Olympics Site Selection Process,supra note 69, at 1.

82. Id. (statement of Rep. Fred Upton, Chairman Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Commerce).
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There is absolutely no mention in any IOC documents available to the
public concerning any wrongdoing during the bidding process for the 1996
Summer Games. 83 The IOC report, following a letter of inquiry to thirtyseven prior bidding cities, also fails to report any allegations of wrongdoing in
awarding the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. 84
While many individuals focused on the Salt Lake City scandal as a
specific incident of misconduct, others chose to focus their criticism on the
IOC's internal culture. Andrew Thomson, a former Australian sports minister,
felt that the IOC became too much of a political organization and that its
present form is inherently flawed. 85 Thomson also felt that the only way for
the IOC to completely reform itself was to remove the present leadership,
including President Juan Antonio Samaranch. 86
Senator Mitchell, who performed his own investigation into the Salt Lake
dealings, which he subsequently presented to the United States Senate, stated
The activity in which the Salt Lake committees engaged was
part of a broader culture of improper gift giving in which
candidate cities provided things of value to IOC members in
an effort to buy their votes . . . Salt Lake City . . . did not

invent this culture; they joined one that was already
flourishing.87
The overwhelming amount of evidence found by those investigating the
dealings in Salt Lake City has shown that it was not a one-time incident but
rather part of a developed culture within the IOC. This culture was evident
once again when the IOC experienced a crisis during the 2010 Winter
Olympic Games in Vancouver. 8 8 On the opening day of the games, Nodar
Kumaritashvili (Nodar), a Georgian luger, died during a training run crash that
caused "blunt force trauma" to his head when he flew off of the track. 89 After
a two month investigation, the International Luge Federation (FIL) concluded

83. IOC Crisis and Reform, supra note 35.
84. Id.

85. JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 75.
86. Id
87. Id. at 77.
88. Luge Federation: Driver Partly to Blame for Olympic Death, FOXSPORTS.cOM, Apr. 19,
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that a "series of interrelated events . . . led to this tragedy." 90 The FIL also

stated that it "does not foresee making any recommendations to the IOC for
changes" and concentrated on split second mistakes made by the driver
navigating the course, rather than the lack of safety barriers on the speedy
track that led to the impact that directly resulted in Nodar's death. 9 '
Vancouver Olympic Committee Chief Executive, John Furlong, made the
most compelling statement resonant of the IOC's protectionist culture. 92
Upon release of the report, he stated that he was "grateful for their affirmation
of the safety measures at the (Whistler Sliding Center) that they took to protect
all athletes and for their determination to learn from this tragedy." 93 Rather
than indicating that it was a mistake to leave steel poles exposed next to the
track immediately after one of the fastest and most dangerous turns of the
course, the members of the Olympic movement once again focused on a denial
of wrongdoing, rather than learning from scandal and tragedy to institute real
reforms for the future. 94 This shows that the culture of internal protectionism
between the IOC and its sport governing body partnerships has not changed
since the 2002 Salt Lake Olympic Games bribery scandal and brings to
question whether the reforms the IOC instituted after the 2002 scandal were
enough to eliminate the culture that led to scandal in Salt Lake City.
Although the majority of individuals believe that the newly enacted
reforms are insufficient as presently written, there are a few who believe that
the current reforms are too strict. 95 Unfortunately, the one who has been most
outspoken concerning the strictness of the reforms is, himself, a senior
Olympic official. 96 Denis Oswald (Oswald), head of the Association of
Summer Olympic International Federations and an IOC member, believes that
the new rules are too stringent in that they prevent cities that stage world
championships from using those events to promote staging the Olympic
Games. 97 The current rules "prohibit candidate cities from promoting their
Olympic bids while staging major international sports events." 98 He believes
that the IOC has lost sight of the rules' purpose and "that organizing the sports
event is an unfair way to promote a candidature, and it cannot lead to bribery
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See Official Urges Change in Bid Rules, PTTrSBURGHLIVE.COM,
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_134175.html.
96. See id
97. Id.
98. Id.
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or whatever." 99 Furthermore, he believes that "the candidate cities will
instead promote their bids in the media or elsewhere, diverting money from
their events."10 0 Oswald believes that the IOC Ethics rules are too strict, but
his criticism does not focus on the controlling aspect of the reform. Instead,
he fears that the application of the reforms is incorrect.10 1 Allowing IOC
members to visit a city during a major world championship competition does
present a bias toward those cities that can be observed during those times
when compared against those cities that do not have a world championship
scheduled during the evaluation process.1 02 Although there may be no
evidence that an IOC visit during that time is related to bribery, there are
increased opportunities and temptations if a visit occurs during such an event.
With a world championship comes increased visits from sponsors and wealthy
individuals who have the means to create a temptation for impropriety. 103 As
we have seen through the experiences in Salt Lake City, IOC members are not
immune from temptation, and any effort on behalf of the IOC to resist such
temptation in the future is a step in the right direction.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

Upon conclusion of the IOC's investigation, the Subcommittee
reconvened to discuss their views on the IOC's reforms. 104 Although they
believed that the IOC had taken adequate action initially, the Subcommittee
unanimously agreed to the need for further action.o10 In order to complete the
reform effort, the Subcommittee felt additional steps needed to be taken. 106
First, they argue that the IOC needs to make structural changes to establish
the IOC's accountability to the Olympic Movement and to the general
public. 107 Second, the Subcommittee proposed that the IOC strengthen its bid
procedure manual in governing the selection of host cities.1 08 The final, and
most radical, reform proposal involved changing the status of the IOC. 109 The
99. Id.
100. Id
101. See id
102. See id.
103. See id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Olympics Site Selection Process, supra note 69, at 451.
Id at 451-570.
See id
See id
See id
See id
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Subcommittee proposed that the IOC re-designate itself as a "public
international organization" pursuant to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
International Transactions and pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.110

The first proposal, which recommends making detailed structural changes
to establish accountability to the Olympic movement and to the public,
concentrates on the absence of accountability inherent in the IOC's governing
structure.1 11 Recommendations included changing the election procedure to
establish a membership where a substantial majority of IOC members are
elected by the National Olympic Organizations, the International Federations,
and other organizations that are not directly connected to the IOC.11 2 Another
method of enforcing accountability would be to establish term limits and
subject IOC members to periodic reelection.11 3 The Subcommittee also felt
that accountability would be increased by having public meetings, an annual
audit that would be disclosed publicly, and a comprehensive conflict of
interest policy that would be enforced. 1 14 Finally, the Subcommittee argued
that the IOC should create an office of compliance within the organization to
govern the relationships between candidate cities and IOC members.115 This
office of compliance should require all IOC members to disclose any gifts
offered, whether accepted or declined by the individual member.116
The Subcommittee did not end its recommendations there; it also gave
suggestions on how the IOC should strengthen its Bid Procedures Manual,
which governs the selection of host cities.117 The first suggestion by the
House Subcommittee, which was enacted by the IOC as of the 2012 Summer
Games selection process, is to make the rules it changed, by creating the Code
of Ethics in 1999, contractually enforceable."18 Furthermore, the House
Subcommittee recommended that the IOC permit visits to candidate cities only
if all expenses are borne by the IOC or the members themselves, prohibit
candidate cities from reimbursing travel expenses, establish a deposit system
to cover any expenses incurred by the IOC, prohibit candidate cities from
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giving gifts, and prohibit IOC members from participating in any scholarship
or assistance programs during the site selection process.1 1 9 As of December
2003, the IOC banned the exchange of gifts, except those of nominal value in
accordance with prevailing local customs as a mark of respect or friendship,
between candidate cities and IOC members and regulates conflicts of interests
among members and candidate cities. 120
Presently, the IOC Ethics Commission has been developed to regulate its
members and the actions of candidate cities, 12 1 but it does not have near the
authority that the recommended Office of Compliance would have. It is also
important to note that the IOC Executive Committee still has oversight
authority of the Ethics Committee. 122 This results in a body that has no
autonomy and is completely dependent on the IOC Executive Committee to
enforce any recommendation. 123 The structure of the IOC Ethics Committee
raises concerns about conflicts of interests within the organization and places
doubt on the impartiality of any decisions that follow an IOC Ethics
Commission investigation.
The lack of oversight over IOC actions led to the final, and most radical,
part of the House Subcommittee's recommendation in critiquing the IOC's
reform. This would place the IOC accountable under United States law. 124
The applicable law is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 125 The
FCPA is used by law enforcement to combat official corruption in
international business transactions.126 The FCPA applies both to foreign
public officials and the individuals with whom they are transacting. 127 If the
IOC allows for itself to be held accountable under United States Law in the
future, this allows for potential prosecution of both the individual providing
the alleged inducement and the complicit IOC members under the FCPA if a
similar scandal ever occurs in the future. As convictions for willful violations
of the FCPA are subject to up to a five million dollar fine and up to twenty
years in prison, 12 8 this penalty can potentially provide a significant deterrent
for offering and soliciting bribes in conjunction with site selection of future
119. Olympics Site Selection Process,supra note 69, at 451-570.
120. IOC RULES CONCERNING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 62; IOC CODE OF ETHICS,
supra note 46, at PREAMBLE.
121. IOC CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 46, at PREAMBLE.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Olympics Site Selection Process,supra note 69, at 451-570.
125. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. (2000).
126. Id. at
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international sporting events. But, the FCPA may not be applicable to the
IOC, even if it allows for the organization and its membership to be held
accountable under United States law. The Subcommittee, in concluding its
investigation, stated that "in practically every instance, the IOC members were
not acting in the role of a foreign official when they were offered or solicited
things of value. Rather, they were acting in their capacities as members of the
IOC, a private entity, albeit acting in a quasi-public capacity."l 2 9 If the
evidence proved that this was in fact the case, the IOC members' conduct
would fall outside the jurisdiction of the FCPA.1 30
In 1994, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
adopted a Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions at the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (Convention).' 3 ' Thirty-four
nations, including the United States and Switzerland, have adopted this
Convention, 132 giving it the same effect as a statute under United States
law.1 33 It is also important to note that, out of twenty-two nations that have
ever hosted the Olympic Games, twenty are signatories of this Convention. 134
The Convention, which entered into force on February 15, 1999, calls for the
signatory to enact in their countries' anti-bribery laws a definition of "foreign
public officials official" that includes "any official or agent of a public
international organization." 35 Presently, the Convention's provisions are
enacted into the United States FCPA.1 36 The Subcommittee requested that the
USOC request the issuance of an executive order designating the IOC as a
"public international organization" under the FCPA.1 37 The effect of this
executive order would make bribery of an IOC member a crime punishable
under the FCPA and put United States citizens on notice that attempting to
influence an IOC member during the selection process is a crime under the
129. Olympics Site Selection Process, supra note 69, at 451-570.
130. Id. at 479 (prepared statement of Juan Antonio Samaranch, President, IOC).
131. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

(2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY].

132. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions,OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649 34859
2017813_1_1_1,00.htmi (last visited Nov. 23, 2010).
133. U.S. CONST. art. VI. § 2.
134. Olympics Site Selection Process, supra note 69, at 112 (statement of William J. Hybl,
president of the U.S. Olympic Committee).
135. CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY, supra note 131, at 6.
136. Olympics Site Selection Process,supra note 69, at 528.
137. See id at 528-30.
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FCPA.138 The Subcommittee also requests that the President of the United
States persuade other countries to enact similar orders declaring the IOC as a
public international organization.1 39 The Subcommittee hopes that the IOC
will require all countries to enact this provision before being allowed to enter a
bid to host the Olympic Games. 140 The Subcommittee firmly feels that the
effect of this recommendation would be limited to a defined subject that is
exclusively international and applicable only in the limited context of
competitions to host the Olympic Games.141
Upon completing their critique of the IOC's reforms, the United States
Congress stated that more aggressive reform and acceptance of responsibility
at every level of the Olympic Movement was necessary to restore integrity.14 2
Mere finger pointing at those who were responsible for the scandalous conduct
will not resolve the lack of accountability within the Olympic Movement. 143
The final words of the Subcommittee are the most telling concerning their
opinion of the IOC's reform: "[t]imely, aggressive reform goes hand-in-hand
with acceptance of responsibility. It is the true measure of commitment. Each
Olympic entity has pledged to reform. The seriousness of that commitment
and the credibility of the Olympic Movement turn on the extent to which that
reform is undertaken."l44
VII. THE ROAD AHEAD

If the events that took place in the Salt Lake bid scandal took place within
the statutory regime of United States administrative law rather than within the
IOC, the results would have been drastically different. Although the National
Collegiate Athletic Association and federal administrative agencies enjoy the
comfort of the standard of review from Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 14 5 which upholds actions taken by a private or public
agency so long as those actions are not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law,1 4 6 the IOC enjoys even more limited legal review
and has nearly complete autonomy in its decision-making capacity. Although
138.
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a Swiss Federal Tribunal is effective in reviewing judgments made by the
Court of Arbitration for Sport, its slack business law is ineffective in
monitoring the activities of the IOC as a corporation. The official legal status
of the IOC is as an "international non-governmental not-for-profit
organization ... in the form of an association with the status of a legal person,
recognised [sic] by the Swiss Federal Council." 47 Proposed reforms in Swiss
business law may have an effect on the IOC. For example, in 2001, the
government of Switzerland created the Federal Office of Justice "Working
Group on Corporate Governance" (Working Group).1 48
The goal of the Working Group is to develop new laws that increase
accountability at all levels for all types of corporations, even nonprofit,
nongovernmental ones, like the IOC.149 The Working Group also intends to
create an efficient system of "checks and balances" and to, thereby, guarantee
a balanced distribution of power in a corporation.'1 0 This is something
definitely lacking in the present form of the IOC, where all aspects of the IOC,
including the Ethics Committee, report to the IOC Executive Board. The goal
of the Working Group further states that "[t]he interests of the Company, of
the markets and of shareholders as well as of any involved third parties should
be put in relationship to each other."' 5 '
Included among the proposed reforms are holding a Board of Directors
accountable to the government for the actions of the corporation as a whole. 152
If these potential reforms are extended to include not-for-profit,
nongovernmental organizations like the IOC, then we can expect a more
radical reform effort in the IOC in an attempt to insulate the IOC Executive
Board from being held accountable for wrongdoings performed by their
members. But, until this time comes, we are unlikely to see the IOC Ethics
Commission segregated from the Executive Board. An additional, and equally
monumental, reform would be to change this legal status to that of a "public
international corporation," so that those individuals who would attempt to
bribe an IOC official could be prosecuted under that country's fraud and
bribery laws. This would be effective in allowing stricter governmental
prosecution than is what is currently available and would undoubtedly result in
individuals second-guessing any attempt to bribe an IOC official, fearing
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criminal prosecution for such an act.
The events surrounding Salt Lake City's candidacy for the 2002 Olympic
Games displayed the need for such radical reform within the IOC more than
ever before. As former IOC Vice President, Dick Pound, stated, "there is no
room for cheaters in the Olympic Games." 15 3 Although Dick Pound was
discussing violations of the World Anti-Doping Agency's Code by Olympic
Participants, the IOC has not been as stringent in regulating cheaters within the
Olympic Movement as it has among its key participants. Yes, it is true that ten
IOC members were either expelled or resigned in the wake of the scandal, but
not much has happened since then.
Nothing presents this more clearly than the IOC's own Crisis and Reform
Chronology, which abruptly ends with the reforms made to the Olympic
Charter on December 12, 1999.154 Instead, the IOC chose to view the
occurrences at Salt Lake as a single failure by corrupt individuals, rather than
a failure of the structure of the Olympic family. Juan Antonio Samaranch,
IOC President at the time of the scandal, best embodies this view. He stated
that the scandal had been "exaggerated" by reporters and that "I can't accept
that we are depicted as a gang of criminals or that the Salt Lake organizers
were victims. They are as guilty as those who were corrupted. They were the
corrupters." 1 55
Like the creation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and the World AntiDoping Agency, the creation of the IOC Ethics Commission has been
carefully constructed in such a manner that it is dependent upon the IOC
Executive Committee for its authority.1 56 The only way to remove any doubt
of impropriety within the Olympic Movement is to separate these affiliate
organizations and establish checks and balances within the organization.
Unfortunately, as long as the IOC remains resistant to independent
oversight of their activities, scandals similar to those in Salt Lake City are
inevitable. We are unlikely to see any additional reform in the upcoming
years, which would likely prevent another scandal. The IOC has been stalwart
in its resistance to reformation. Unless the structure of the Olympic family is
changed, it is unlikely that we will ever see a change in the politicization of
the IOC. Although, it is unlikely we will ever see a scandal containing the
same factual matters as the Salt Lake City bid scandal, the IOC is still
153. Dick Pound, Address before the 9th International Association of Sports Law Congress
(September 25, 2003).
154. IOC Crisis and Reform, supra note 35, at 4.
155. JENNINGS, supra note 11, at 77.
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vulnerable to the whims of powerful individuals who feel that the top
members of the IOC Executive Committee will insulate them from any legal
prosecution for their actions. Although it is true that the IOC has reformed
itself somewhat, it did the minimum required of it. It performed as much
reform as necessary to protect itself and to prove to the international
community that it was appalled by the dealings on the shores of the Great Salt
Lake. It is time that the IOC, which can claim power equal to some small
European countries, holds itself accountable for its actions, which have a
worldwide effect. Only then can we hold accountable those who would
otherwise violate international norms of fair play.
Creating a Compliance Division, separate of the IOC Executive
Committee, would be a great first step in showing the world that the IOC is
serious in making sure that the Olympics are fair for all participants. Although
the IOC has concentrated on the fairness of competition in their events, it is
now time to ensure fairness among those who wish to have the privilege of
hosting the games. The Olympic Charter states in its Fundamental Principle
that
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind.
Blending sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to
create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational
value of good example and respect for universal fundamental
ethical principles. 15 7
Recently, the IOC has failed in promoting this fundamental principle and
fails to promote itself as the model for ethical principles. Although the recent
reforms are an improvement, they are not nearly enough, and the IOC must
hold itself more accountable, either by law or by incorporating an autonomous
organization to oversee the activities of the organization. Only when it does
this will the IOC revert back to concentrating on its founding principles, rather
than being distracted by wealth and power, finally lifting the black cloud of
corruption and allowing the Olympic flame to burn clean once again.
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